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In this paper, we document whether and how much the equalizing force of earnings mobility
has changed in France in the 1990s. For this purpose, we use a representative three-year panel,
the French Labour Force Survey. We develop a model of earnings dynamics that combines a
ﬂexible speciﬁcation of marginal earnings distributions (to ﬁt the large cross-sectional dimension
of the data) with a tight parametric representation of the dynamics (adapted to the short time-
series dimension). Log earnings are modelled as the sum of a deterministic component, an
individual ﬁxed eﬀect, and a transitory component which is assumed ﬁrst-order Markov. The
transition probability of the transitory component is modelled as a one-parameter Plackett
copula. We estimate this model using a sequential EM algorithm.
We exploit the estimated model to study employment/earnings inequality in France over the
1990-2002 period. We show that, in phase with business cycle ﬂuctuations (a recession in 1993
and two peaks in 1990 and 2000), earnings mobility decreases when cross-section inequality
and unemployment risk increase. We simulate individual earnings trajectories and compute
present values of lifetime earnings over various horizons. Inequality presents a hump-shaped
evolution over the period, with a 9% increase between 1990 and 1995 and a decrease afterwards.
Accounting for unemployment yields an increase of 11%. Moreover, this increase is persistent,
as it translates into a 12% increase in the variance of log present values. The ratio of inequality
in present values to inequality in one-year earnings, a natural measure of immobility or of the
persistence of inequality, remains remarkably constant over the business cycle.
JEL classiﬁcation numbers: D30, D63, J22, J64.
Keywords: Inequality, mobility, earnings dynamics, copulas.
Acknowledgements:1 Introduction
It is generally agreed that measuring earnings dispersion in one single year does not provide
an accurate picture of earnings inequality if individual earnings change over time. Forward-
looking consumers can indeed self-insure against transitory earnings shocks to some extent.
Given the scarcity of panel data on consumption, longer-run earnings inequality thus provides
a useful characterization, albeit imperfect, of the inequality in the intertemporal consumption
sets available to individuals (Haider, 2001).1
Transitory earnings shocks are usually smoothed by averaging at least ﬁve years of individual
earnings observations.2 However, this approach is not readily implementable because of business
cycle ﬂuctuations. For example, Gottschalk and Moﬃtt’s (1994) well-cited paper compares
earnings inequality in the 1970s and the 1980s. If business cycles are irregular or if their
periodicity is diﬀerent from 10 years, contrasting the distributions of 10-year average earnings
in 1970-1979 and in 1980-1989 will not necessarily characterize long-run trends. This is why the
literature has recently tried to develop models of earnings dynamics incorporating structural
change.3
In this paper, we document changes in earnings inequality, and earnings and employment
mobility in France in the 1990s. We show that the ﬁrst half of the period is characterized by
a simultaneous increase in wage inequality, wage immobility and unemployment risk, and the
second half by a mirroring decrease. As 1988-1990 and 1998-2000 correspond to periods of
fast growth and 1993 to a recession, business cycle conditions appear strongly associated with
individual earnings dynamics.
Because of this structural instability, we ﬁrst develop a model of individual earnings dy-
namics with time-varying parameters. Then, we use the estimated model to simulate individual
1Very few studies have tried to face the scarcity of panel data on consumption and document long-run
consumption inequality. An essentially exhaustive list of references includes Cuttler and Katz (1992), Attanasio
and Davis (1996), Blundell and Preston (1998), and Krueger and Perri (2001).
2Gottschalk and Moﬃtt (2002) claim indeed that “a shorter lag would [give] a more distorted picture of the
growth of permanent variances because short lags would be contaminated by increasing transitory variances” (p.
C72). For recent applications of this technique, see e.g. Burkhauser, Holtz-Eakin and Rhody (1997), Burkhauser
and Poupore, (1997), Maasoumi and Trede (2001), Aaberge et al., (2002) and Van Kerm (2004).
3Examples of models of earnings dynamics with time-varying parameters can be found in Moﬃtt and
Gottschalk (2002), Heathcote, Storesletten and Violante (2004), Meghir and Pistaferri (2004), and Guvenen
(2005).
1trajectories for each year of the 1990-decade and compute measures of inequality of Present
Values (PVs) of earnings sequences of various lengths. Finally, by computing the ratio of the
inequality in PVs to earnings inequality in one cross-section, we document how the equalizing
force of mobility changed in the 1990s.4
Our model is designed to ﬁt the French Labour Force Survey (LFS), a sequence of 11 large
three-year panels from 1990-1992 to 2000-2002. Contrary to other well-used panels like the
PSID, LFSs typically follow large samples of individuals over short periods of time. The model
therefore combines a ﬂexible speciﬁcation of marginal earnings distributions—to ﬁt the large
cross-sections—with a tight parametric speciﬁcation of the dynamics—adapted to the small
time-series dimension.
Log wages are modelled as a standard linear combination of two factors (an individual
ﬁxed eﬀect and a ﬁrst-order Markov transitory shock), with time-varying factor loadings. The
distribution of the individual eﬀect is assumed discrete with many support points. The marginal
density of the transitory component is a normal mixture, and in order to map the marginals
onto the joint distribution of couples of consecutive realizations we use a parametric copula.
We ﬁnd that Plackett’s (1965) one-parameter copula captures the year-to-year dynamics quite
well. Transitions between employment and unemployment are modelled as a Markov chain
conditional on the ﬁxed eﬀect.
The model being non-identiﬁed when factor loadings are allowed to vary freely over time, we
assume that they vary suﬃciently slowly and smoothly for each three-year panel to face a speciﬁc
set of time-invariant factor loadings. For each three-year panel, the model thus takes the form
of a mixture of nonlinear ﬁrst-order Markov models. The nonlinearity renders identiﬁcation
diﬃcult to prove. We nevertheless discuss an identiﬁcation algorithm and conjecture that the
semi-parametric identiﬁcation of the distribution of ﬁxed eﬀects and transitory shocks is likely
to hold in general.
We estimate the model using a sequential EM algorithm (see Arcidiacono and Jones, 2003),
because EM algorithm are particularly well adapted to the estimation of discrete mixtures.
4Theoretical justiﬁcations for measuring (im)mobility by this ratio can be found in Shorrocks (1978) and
Fields (2005).
2After estimating a speciﬁc set of parameters for each subpanel, we then simulate one earnings
trajectory for every individual in each sub-panel, assuming that structural parameters keep their
current values forever. This amounts to assuming that individuals have myopic expectations.5
We ﬁnd that the permanent component (ﬁxed eﬀect) has a distribution that is close to
Gaussian. The marginal distribution of the transitory component is leptokurtic, large shocks
being much more probable than for a normal distribution. Unemployment is an important
source of inequality. The variance of log wages (monthly salaries) increases by 9% between
1990 and 1995, and decreases afterwards. In contrast, imputing Unemployment Insurance (UI)
beneﬁts to unemployed workers using a replacement ratio of 60%, the variance of log earnings in
the whole sample increases by 11% between 1990 and 1995. Moreover, this increase is persistent
as the variance of the log PVs of lifetime earnings also increases by 12% in the same period,
before decreasing at the end of that period. Lastly, the equalizing force of mobility, as measured
by the ratio of longer-run inequality to cross-sectional inequality, changed remarkably little over
the period.
Several other authors have recently focused on the inequality of PVs of lifetime earnings,
as opposed to cross-sectional earnings inequality (e.g. Haider, 2001, Flinn, 2002, Bowlus and
Robin, 2004, and Haider and Solon, 2006). We contribute to this literature by modelling
unobserved heterogeneity,6 by modelling unemployment risk, and by documenting business
cycle eﬀects.
One distinctive feature of the model is that it speciﬁes the full distribution of earnings, not
only its ﬁrst moments. Modelling the full distribution is necessary in order to compute PVs.
In a contribution related to ours, Geweke and Keane (2000) build an AR(1) linear model with
an individual-speciﬁc drift, and with an AR(1) transitory component.7 They adopt a ﬂexible
speciﬁcation (normal mixtures) for the distributions of transitory shocks. By comparison, our
model has a more constrained dynamic structure, that is adapted to very short panels. On the
other hand, Geweke and Keane estimate a stationary model using twenty years of PSID data
5As we simulate one trajectory per individual, we thus focus on realized values of earnings. On the distinction
between ex-ante and ex-post measures of inequality, see Bowlus and Robin (2004).
6Flinn (2002) tried without success to identify and estimate the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity.
7Geweke and Keane (2007) extends their 2000 paper by permitting state probabilities to depend on covariates.
3(1968-1989), while our framework allows parameters to change with the business cycle.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data. Section 3
precisely describes the model and outlines the estimation method. Section 4 presents parameter
estimates and Section 5 shows how the model ﬁts the data. Section 6 shows the main results of
the paper, comparing cross-sectional and longer-run earnings inequality in France in the 1990s.
Section 7 provides a counterfactual analysis. The last Section concludes.
2 The data
The study is based on data drawn from the 1990-2002 French Labour Force Survey (LFS),
conducted by INSEE, the French statistical institute. This survey is a rotating panel, a third
of the sampling units (dwellings) being replaced, every year, by an equivalent number of new
units. The 1990-2002 data contain 11 subpanels indexed by the date of entry of individuals,
from 1990-1992 to 2000-2002. Each subpanel has about 150,000 individuals aged 15 or more, in
75,000 households, which are thus interviewed three times, in March of three subsequent years,
about various aspects of their employment histories.
We use LFS data instead of administrative earnings data, as in Alvarez, Browning and
Erjnaes (2002), because the French register data (DADS) do not follow individuals moving
to public jobs, self-employment or non employment. Moreover, administrative data contain
limited information on individual characteristics.
2.1 Sample construction
Self-reported usual weekly hours worked are likely to be mismeasured. For instance, we notice
that many individuals alternatively report 39 hours worked in one week (the legal working time
in the 1990s), and 40 hours in another. To limit the inﬂuence of measurement error in hours
on our results, we use monthly salaries rather than hourly wages.8 The employment status is
measured at the time of the interview as well as earnings. Monthly earnings are deﬂated by the
retail price index. We drop all earnings observations for students, retirees and self-employed
workers. We only keep male employment/earnings trajectories to limit the role of labour supply
8In the sequel, we shall use “wage” for monthly salaries and “earnings” for a more general deﬁnition of labour
income, that is either employment monthly wage or unemployment insurance beneﬁts (calculated as a fraction
of past wage).
4as a determinant of earnings dispersion. Finally, we trim wages below the ﬁrst and above the
ninety ninth percentiles.
Geographical mobility, among other reasons, generates a signiﬁcant amount of attrition.
Only 53% of the individuals of the sample have complete trajectories, 25% drop out after the
second year, and 22% after the ﬁrst year. We assume attrition exogenous to the employment-
earnings process.
2.2 Descriptive statistics
Table 1 shows a few descriptive statistics. All quantities reported are weighted using the LFS
weights.
The upper part of the table displays these statistics by calendar year, from 1990 to 2000.
We see that the French working population is slightly aging between 1990 and 2002, and is also
becoming more educated. The log wage variance increases from .171 in 1990 to .186 in 1996,
and returns to .178 in 2000. The amplitude of the increase is 8.8%. The unemployment rate
sharply increases at the beginning of the period, from 9.5% in 1991 to 14.1% in 1994, then
remains roughly constant between 1994 and 1999, and drops to 11.6% in 2000.
The lower part of the table completes the description by showing statistics by date of entry
in the panel: from 1990(-1992) to 2000(-2002).9 The panel data allow to document wage
dynamics. We document average wage growth and relative wage immobility, as measured by
Spearman’s rho,10 over one or two years. Wage mobility clearly decreases in the ﬁrst half of
the decade and increases in the second half.
Overall, the ﬁrst half of the 1990s is thus characterized by a simultaneous increase in wage
inequality, wage immobility and unemployment risk, and the second half by a mirroring de-
crease.
9All individuals in the 1990 cross-section are treated as individuals entering the panel in 1990 because, in
the estimation, we are not estimating separate parameters for the 1988 and 1989 cohorts, earnings data being
measured by interval before 1990. A proper treatment of the cohorts of individuals entering the LFS panel before
1990 would have thus required a more complicated model.
10Let X and Y be two random variables with c.d.f. FX and FY , respectively. Spearman’s rho, or rank’s
correlation, is given by ρ = Corr(FX(X),FY (Y )).
5By calendar year
t 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Number of individuals 32749 32402 32855 34629 35689 35674 35780 34927 34945 35309 35376
Age 37.9 38.0 38.1 38.2 38.4 38.6 38.8 39.0 39.1 39.2 39.3
Age at the end of school 17.5 17.5 17.6 17.8 17.9 18.0 18.1 18.2 18.3 18.5 18.6
Wages
Mean log wage 8.90 8.92 8.93 8.94 8.93 8.92 8.91 8.92 8.92 8.93 8.93
Log wage variance .171 .173 .172 .179 .183 .185 .186 .186 .179 .178 .178
Unemployment probability .098 .095 .107 .123 .141 .130 .135 .141 .134 .137 .116
By year of entry in the panel
t 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Nb of individuals entering at t 32749 16156 16022 16955 17151 16643 17030 16599 16947 17157 17869
Nb present at t+1 16246 10294 10652 11229 11236 10899 10973 10543 10897 10492 10995
Nb present at t+2 6539 7022 7409 7795 7851 7355 7455 7255 7015 6938 7204
Age 38.7 38.1 38.2 38.4 38.6 38.8 38.9 39.2 39.2 39.4 39.2
Age at the end of school 17.4 17.6 17.7 17.9 18.0 18.1 18.2 18.3 18.4 18.6 18.6
Wages
Mean log wage 8.92 8.93 8.92 8.94 8.92 8.92 8.92 8.92 8.92 8.94 8.94
Log wage variance .166 .173 .177 .181 .185 .188 .184 .182 .179 .179 .173
Wage growth over 1 year .027 .013 .008 .009 .012 .010 .021 .027 .025 .026 .026
Wage growth over 2 years .042 .023 .016 .018 .015 .017 .040 .047 .044 .046 .044
Spearman rho over 1 year .866 .869 .887 .902 .901 .900 .905 .902 .896 .891 .892
Spearman rho over 2 years .851 .859 .872 .883 .885 .892 .890 .882 .886 .871 .861
Unemployment probability
Marginal .091 .099 .119 .126 .140 .131 .134 .142 .131 .128 .112
Transition from employment .034 .041 .050 .045 .042 .041 .040 .037 .038 .030 .033
Transition from unemployment .63 .65 .66 .65 .64 .67 .68 .66 .64 .61 .64
Table 1: Data description, by calendar year and by year of entry in the panel
63 A model of earnings dynamics for short panels
We consider a series of short panel datasets Sj, j = 1,...,J, with many individual observations.
Each subpanel Sj records individual log wages yit and individual attributes xit over a ﬁxed time
length T (3 years for the French LFS):11
Sj = {(yit,xit),i = 1,...,N,t = tj,tj + 1,...,tj + T},
where tj denotes the ﬁrst observation date for panel Sj.
3.1 Parametric speciﬁcation
The wage equation is an extension of Friedman’s (1957) textbook model of individual income
as the sum of a permanent component and a transitory component. Speciﬁcally, we assume
that
yit = βjxit + σjηi + exp(αjxit)εit, t = tj,...,tj + T, (1)
where yit is log wage and xit is a column-vector of individual covariates, with parameters
(row-vectors) indexed by the subpanel index j. There are two error components: ηi is an
individual-speciﬁc eﬀect, and εit is a strongly stationary idiosyncratic component (both with
zero mean and unitary variance). We complete the speciﬁcation of model (1) as follows.
Observed heterogeneity. The vector xit of observed individual characteristics comprises
experience, squared experience, and ﬁve education dummy variables: primary education (I),
some high school (II), high school (III), some college (IV), and college graduate (V).
Unobserved heterogeneity/Permanent component. We model unobserved heterogene-
ity ηi as a strictly exogenous random eﬀect, with zero mean and unitary variance, independent
of xit, for all t, and that follows a discrete distribution with K support points, η
1,...,η
K, with










where 1{·} denotes the indicator function, with
PK
k=1 pkη




11To simplify the exposition, we omit the dependence of T on i, due to attrition.
7The support points are chosen a priori to form a grid on R. In the application, we set
η
k = 2Φ−1(k/(K + 1)), for k = 1,...,K. We also set K large enough, and thus the grid ﬁne
enough, to approximate a continuous distribution well. The reason why we do not discretize the
distribution of ηi in the frequency domain, like a normal mixture for instance, is that modelling
ηi as a discrete variable will permit to exploit a simple EM algorithm for estimation.
We allow the standard deviation of the permanent component of log wages (σj) to vary
with the panel index j. Thus, the dispersion of unobserved heterogeneity depends on calendar
time. However, the distribution of ηi is assumed to be the same in all subpanels Sj.
Transitory component. We model εit as a strongly stationary ﬁrst-order Markov process
with zero marginal mean and unitary variance. The only nonstationarity in the transitory
component of the log wage process that is allowed for is the dependence to experience via the
standard deviation exp(αjxit).
The number of observation periods (T = 3) does not allow for a rich structure of state
dependence. However, the model can be quite ﬂexible as far as the marginal distribution of
εit is concerned because of the very large sample size (more than 30,000 individuals in each
subpanel; see Table 1). We thus use a ﬂexible speciﬁcation for the marginal distribution of εit,
















In order to map the couples of marginal distributions of εit and εi,t+1 onto the joint dis-
tributions of (εit,εi,t+1) we use a copula. Copulas are popular in ﬁnancial econometrics for
modelling dependence structures.12 Here we use a parametric copula so as to tightly parame-
terize earnings mobility, while keeping marginal distributions ﬂexible. Formally, we specify the
joint c.d.f. of εit and εi,t+1 as
F(εit,εi,t+1) (x,y) = C (Fε (x),Fε (y)) (2)
12Copulas were initially introduced by Sklar (1959). See Nelsen (1998) and Joe (1997) for references on copulas
in statistics and ﬁnance.
8where C, the copula, is the joint c.d.f. of the ranks of εit and εi,t+1 in their marginal distribu-
tions.
The copula representation (2) exists for any strongly stationary ﬁrst-order Markov process,
and the copula function C is unique if Fε is continuous (Sklar’s theorem). It is thus not less
general than the standard decomposition of the joint p.d.f. of (εit,εi,t+1) as the product of the
conditional p.d.f. of εi,t+1 given εit and the marginal p.d.f. of εit.
Moreover, copula representations may arise naturally in structural models. In Appendix A
we derive the particular form of the copula for Burdett and Mortensen’s (1998) steady-state
equilibrium search model. The equilibrium earnings distribution Fε depends on the distribu-
tion of ﬁrm productivity and search-matching parameters. Yet, the copula only depends on
the search-matching parameters, because individual mobility is possible in a steady-state econ-
omy only insofar as individuals exchange positions. In this example, an error in the marginal
distribution thus has no eﬀect on the parameters identiﬁed by the copula.







1 + τ(u + v) − [(1 + τ(u + v))2 − 4τ(τ + 1)uv]1/2
o
. (3)
The copula parameter τj is modelled as a function of observed heterogeneity:





It unambiguously indexes mobility from more mobile (low τ) to less mobile (high τ). In par-
ticular, Spearman’s rho (rank’s correlation) is an increasing function of τ (see Appendix B for
details).
Comparing Plackett’s copula to the Gaussian copula, which is implicitly assumed in linear
autoregressive models with normal margins, we found that the latter tends to underestimate
the dependence in the middle of the distribution. Table 2 compares the observed transition
probabilities between two consecutive years to the predicted probabilities using Gaussian and
Plackett copulas. The Gaussian copula clearly underestimates the probabilities of remaining in
the second, third and fourth quintiles.14
13We tried Gaussian, Plackett, Frank, Gumbel, Joe, Clayton, FGM and Log copulas.
14In order to compute the transition probabilities in Table 2 we ﬁrst regress log-wages on experience and
9Observed Gaussian Plackett
.68 .21 .08 .03 .00
.20 .50 .22 .06 .02
.07 .21 .47 .20 .05
.03 .06 .19 .53 .19
.02 .02 .04 .18 .74
.66 .25 .08 .01 .00
.25 .37 .26 .11 .01
.08 .26 .32 .26 .08
.01 .11 .26 .37 .25
.00 .01 .08 .25 .66
.73 .20 .04 .02 .01
.20 .52 .21 .05 .02
.04 .21 .50 .21 .04
.02 .05 .21 .52 .20
.01 .02 .04 .20 .73
Table 2: Fit of transition probabilities across earnings quintiles by Plackett and Gaussian
copulas in 1990-1991
Unemployment. We also need to model transitions from and into unemployment. This is
important for any reasonable description of labour market trajectories in France where unem-
ployment rates are chronically above or around 10%. Let eit be the binary variable that is equal
to 1 if the individual is employed at time t and 0 otherwise. We assume that
ei1 = 1{δ0jxi1 + ζ0jηi + ξi1 > 0}, (4)
eit = 1{ρjei,t−1 + δ1jxit + ζ1jηi + ξit > 0}, t = 2,...,T, (5)
where ξi1 and ξit, t = 2,...,T, follow independent standard normal distributions.15 All para-
meters are again indexed by the subpanel index j.
Calendar-time dependence. In order to reduce the number of parameters to estimate, we
smooth the dynamics of certain parameters with respect to the subpanel index j. There are
many ways to do that (orthogonal polynomials, splines, etc.). First attempts at estimating
the model without smoothing constraints resulted in rather imprecise estimates, yet displaying
rather monotonic variations. We were thus comforted by the idea that a simple cubic polynomial
in j would provide ample enough ﬂexibility. More precisely, we let
• parameters βj,πmj, mj,ωmj vary with j without restriction,
• parameters σj,ζ0j,ρj,ζ1j vary with j as a cubic polynomial,
• parameters αj,γj,δ0j,δ1j: the intercept and the parameters of education dummies vary
with j as cubic polynomials; the parameters of experience and experience squared do not
experience squared. We then compute wage ranks using the empirical c.d.f. of log-wage residuals. Finally, we
estimate the copula parameters by Maximum Likelihood, and compute transition probabilities.
15Note that an alternative would have been to nonparametrically model the unemployment probabilities by
education and experience cells. However, this approach is diﬃcult to implement when the number of support
points for ηi (K) gets large, because of the usual curse of dimensionality.
10depend on j.
3.2 Identiﬁcation
Let us consider the model for one single cohort of workers, neglecting the employment/unemployment
process. For each individual i, we observe log wages yit at three dates t = 1,2,3, such that
yit = ηi + εit.
If ηi, εi1 and εi2 are independently distributed, then the three marginal distributions of ηi, εi1
and εi2 are nonparametrically identiﬁed from the joint distribution of (yi1,yi2) (see Kotlarski,
1967). As we have one more year, we should, intuitively, be able to allow for some dependence
between the shocks.
In Appendix C, we detail the following identiﬁcation algorithm. First, ηi being independent
of εit, given the marginal distribution of ηi one can identify the marginal distribution of εit
from that of yit by nonparametric deconvolution. Then, from the joint distribution of (yi1,yi2)
or (yi2,yi3) one recovers the copula density, still for a given distribution of ηi. Lastly, using the
ﬁrst-order Markov assumption for (εit), the information in the joint distribution of (yi1,yi3) or
(yi1,yi2,yi3) reveals the marginal distribution of ηi.
Unfortunately, deriving precise conditions guaranteeing the validity of this simple construc-
tive identiﬁcation procedure is diﬃcult and clearly exceeds the scope of this paper. The iden-
tiﬁcation procedure is trivially correct for the linear case of a Gaussian copula with Gaussian
margins, but, otherwise, involves complicated inverse problems. This is deﬁnitely not a straight-
forward generalization of Kotlarski’s result. Yet, we speculate that it works under fairly general
conditions. In the empirical analysis we will show that, when we increase the number of support
points for the distribution of ηi, the estimated discrete distribution appears to converge to a
continuous limit (see Figure 1 below).
Nonstationary case. Now, consider the model:
yit = σtηi + ωtεit, t = 1,...,T,
Varηi = Varεit = 1, Cov(εit,εi,t−1) = ρt.
11Parameters σt, ωt and ρt are not identiﬁable from second-order moments with only T = 3
observations per individual (6 moments for 8 parameters).16 It is only for T ≥ 5 that the number
of moment conditions (T (T + 1)/2) is greater than the number of parameters (3T − 1). Our
identifying assumption is that σt, ωt and ρt change slowly over time. We make this statement
precise by assuming that σt, ωt and ρt can be assumed constant in each three-year panel.
4 Estimation results
The true value of the unobserved heterogeneity component ηi being unknown but equal to η
k
with probability pk, the likelihood for one individual observation is a discrete mixture. We take
advantage of the discrete mixture in the estimation by using a sequential variant of the EM
algorithm that we detail in Appendix D. Using arguments similar to Arcidiacono and Jones
(2003), this estimation procedure can be shown to deliver a consistent estimator of the model’s
parameters, asymptotically equivalent to a GMM estimator. This algorithm is very simple to
implement but is slow to converge, as usually are EM-type algorithms. It delivers, as a by-
product of the estimation, the posterior probabilities of unknown types η
k, which can be used
to simulate individual trajectories.
In the remainder of this section, we present the parameter estimates that the EM algorithm
delivers for all subpanels 1990-1992 to 2000-2002.
4.1 Distribution of unobserved heterogeneity
Figure 1 shows the distribution of the individual eﬀect ηi for diﬀerent choices of support. We
draw the density of the standard normal distribution for comparison. There is clear evidence of
a “convergence” of the distribution of ηi to a continuous density when K increases. Moreover,
this density resembles a standard normal density. This ﬁnding is consistent with what Horowitz
and Markatou (1996) found for the U.S., using a model with an individual-speciﬁc eﬀect and
i.i.d. transitory shocks. It is also consistent with the idea that the unobserved heterogeneity
component aggregates many missing individual characteristics.
16Yet they are if σt is constant, as the Appendix C shows. Appendix C develops an identiﬁcation algorithm for
the general nonstationary case where the marginal distribution of εit and the copula of (εit,εi,t+1) are indexed
by t.
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unobserved heterogeneity
−3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3
unobserved heterogeneity
K = 5 K = 10
−3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3
unobserved heterogeneity
−3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3
unobserved heterogeneity
K = 15 K = 20
(solid line = data; dashed line = standard normal density)
Figure 1: Distribution of unobserved heterogeneity, ηi, for diﬀerent values of K, the number of
support points
134.2 Eﬀects of covariates
Table 3 displays parameter estimates for subpanel 1990-1992, all other subpanels yielding similar
estimates. Asymptotic standard errors are given in parentheses.17
The mean log wage is concave in experience, with a maximum at 31 years. The copula
parameter is monotonically increasing in experience, and so relative mobility decreases with
experience. The relation between unemployment risk and experience is U-shaped, with a min-
imum at 25 years of experience. This is true for the initial probability of being unemployed as
well as for the transition probabilities into unemployment. Lastly, the log wage variance is also
initially decreasing with experience, but starts to increase after only 8 years.
Education has an increasing eﬀect on the mean log wage and the transitory log wage vari-
ance, and a decreasing eﬀect on mobility and unemployment risk. The unobserved heterogeneity
component ηi has the same eﬀects as education. Lastly, the strong positive eﬀect of eit−1 on
eit shows that the employment status is highly persistent, even after accounting for unobserved
heterogeneity.
On Figure 2 we draw the density of εit. We observe that the distribution is highly non-
normal, displaying a very peaked mode and some skewness to the left. This visual impression
is conﬁrmed by the skewness and kurtosis values, respectively equal to .26 and 7.5. The non-
normality of transitory shocks εit contrasts with the near-normality of the permanent component
ηi.
4.3 Changes across subpanels
The left panel in Figure 3 shows the evolution of the variance of the deterministic component
of log wages, i.e. Var(βjxit). It increases from .070 in 1990-1992 to .081 in 1995-1997 (a 16%
increase), and returns to its initial level in 2000-2002. In Table 4 we report the results of an
Oaxaca decomposition, taking 1990-1992 as reference. The contribution of age and education
to the log wage variance (row labelled “composition eﬀects” in the Table) increases in France
in the 1990s because the average age and education of the labour force increase in this period
(see Table 1). Composition eﬀects account for 6 percentage points (out of 16) of the rise of
17We report the asymptotic standard errors of the last EM step before numerical convergence, i.e. taking the
prior probability of each heterogeneity type as given. These are thus likely to be understated.
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(solid line = data; dashed = standard normal density)
Figure 2: Density of εit for subpanel 1990-1992
151990 1993 1995 1997 2000
Composition eﬀects .0700 .0704 .0741 .0734 .0742
+ returns to education .0700 .0700 .0733 .0696 .0666
+ returns to experience .0700 .0699 .0807 .0755 .0698
Table 4: Oaxaca decomposition of the deterministic component of the variance of log wages
(reference = 1990-1992)
the log wage variance between 1990-1992 and 1995-1997. Allowing the return to education
to change (in the second row), the variance decreases. This is because returns to education
decrease in France in the 1990s (see Figure 4). An active educational policy is responsible of
the rising high school graduation rate, from 35% in 1985 to 65% in 1995. The diminishing
returns to education could thus indicate that the educational improvement does not truly
reﬂect augmented productivity but rather lower certiﬁcation levels. At the same time, returns
to experience increase very steeply during the ﬁrst half of the 1990s (30%), and compensate for
some of the variance reduction due to lower returns to education.18
The central and right panels in Figure 3 display the evolution of two key parameters, that
we shall refer to as the permanent and transitory components of the log wage variance. The ﬁrst
one is σ2
j, and is approximately equal to the variance of the eﬀect of unobserved heterogeneity
ηi on log wages.19 The second term is the average variance of stationary shocks, namely the
mean of exp(2αjxit). Figure 3 shows that the deterministic, permanent and transitory compo-
nents respectively account for about 40%, 30% and 30% of the log wage variance, respectively.
Moreover, permanent and transitory variances follow opposite dynamics. While the permanent
component increased by 20% at the beginning of the observation period, to reach a peak in
1992-1994, meanwhile, the transitory component decreased by 15%.
18The eﬀect of experience on the mean log wage is quadratic in the model, so the return to experience is linear
in experience. The mean return in the sample is reported on the right panel of Figure 4.
19The variance of ηi in the sample of employed workers is not exactly equal to 1 because unemployment risk
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year
(solid line = level II; dashed = III; dotted = IV;
dotted = V; Reference level is I)
Figure 4: Average returns to education and experience
5 Model ﬁt
In this section, we evaluate the capacity of the model to reproduce several features of the data.
5.1 Marginal earnings distribution and earnings dynamics in 1990-1992
Figures 5 and 6 compare actual and predicted distributions of log wage levels yit and log wage
residuals uit = yit −βjxit for 1990-1992.20 In Figure 5, we separately consider the distributions
of levels, yit, ﬁrst and second diﬀerences, yit − yit−1 and yit − yit−2, and 3-year averages,
(yit + yit+1 + yit+2)/3. Figure 6 repeats this comparison study for residuals. Overall, the ﬁt
is good although the model does not fully succeed in capturing the peak of the distribution
of second diﬀerences. Moreover, comparing the upper left and lower right panels on the two
ﬁgures shows that the additive structure of the model fails to ﬁt precisely the skewness of log
wages, though the full distribution of log wage residuals is very well ﬁtted.
5.2 Transition probabilities in 1990-1992
Next, we consider the transition probabilities across earnings quintiles between t and t+1, and
between t and t + 2. Actual and predicted probability matrices are displayed in Table 5. The
ﬁt is there also quite good, despite a certain tendency to overestimate mobility in the upper
part of the distribution.




























































3−year averages of log wages
(solid line = data; dashed = model’s prediction)




























































3−year averages of log wage residuals
(solid line = data; dashed = model’s prediction)
Figure 6: Fit of the marginal distribution of log wage residuals, subpanel 1990-1992
19Actual Predicted
1990/1991
.70 .20 .07 .02 .01
.21 .54 .19 .04 .01
.06 .22 .53 .17 .02
.02 .03 .18 .63 .14
.01 .01 .02 .14 .82
.76 .18 .04 .01 .00
.19 .56 .19 .05 .01
.04 .20 .53 .19 .03
.01 .05 .20 .57 .16
.00 .01 .03 .16 .79
1990/1992
.67 .23 .08 .02 .01
.23 .49 .22 .04 .01
.07 .23 .50 .18 .03
.02 .04 .19 .59 .16
.01 .01 .02 .16 .80
.68 .22 .07 .03 .01
.22 .46 .22 .08 .02
.07 .22 .43 .22 .06
.02 .08 .23 .47 .20
.01 .02 .05 .20 .72
Table 5: Fit of transition probabilities across earnings quintiles in 1990-1992
5.3 Evolution 1990-2000
Finally, we look at the capacity of the model to reproduce the changes in the log wage distrib-
ution, wage dynamics and unemployment risk across subpanels, from 1990-1992 to 2000-2002.
The top panels of Figure 7 show how the model ﬁts the variance, the skewness and the kurtosis
of log wages. The middle panels compare Spearman’s rho for actual and simulated log wage
dynamics over one and two years, and the variance of ﬁrst-diﬀerences of log earnings levels.
The lower panels plot unemployment probabilities in the ﬁrst year, and transition probabilities
from employment and from unemployment. Again, the overall ﬁt is quite satisfactory, although
the central graph shows that the model underpredicts Spearman’s rho two years apart. It is
likely that the model predicts too much mobility because of the ﬁrst-order-Markov assumption.
6 Longer-run inequality
With a fully parametric model in hand, we can now simulate individual earnings trajectories.
Speciﬁcally, we assign to every individual in the survey the parameters of the subpanel s/he be-
longs to.21 We then draw a value for the unobserved heterogeneity component ηi conditional on
observations, using the posterior distribution of latent variables that the EM algorithm delivers.
Next, given ηi and given the ﬁrst three employment/earnings observations Yit,Yi,t+1,Yi,t+2, we
simulate employment/earnings trajectories after t + 2, Yi,t+3,Yi,t+4,..., until retirement at age
21So, in a given calendar year two individuals who entered the data at diﬀerent dates are assigned diﬀerent
parameters, and thus draw their earnings from diﬀerent distributions. This introduces some degree of smoothing
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1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000
year
Marginal probability From employment From unemployment
(solid line = data; dashed = model’s prediction)
Figure 7: Model ﬁt, subpanels 1990-1992 to 2000-2002
2
165. Lastly, we impute a replacement income to unemployed individuals equal to 60% of the last
wage.22 For any individual who is unemployed in the ﬁrst year, we draw a “last wage” from
the equilibrium (marginal) wage distribution.




Yit + βYi,t+1 + ... + βHit−1Yi,t+Hit−1
1 + β + ... + βHit−1 ,
where Hit = min{H,65 − Ageit} is the minimum of H and the remaining time before retire-
ment, and β = .95. When the horizon H is less than the subpanel length, Y P
itH is a sample
average. Thus, our approach extends the classical way of measuring permanent income to short
panels, by simulating earnings trajectories beyond the observation period. And for this purpose,
we need a model that speciﬁes the full distribution of the data.
Table 6 displays the variances of log PVs, yP
itH = lnY P
itH, together with other inequality
indices (Gini index and 90/10 percentile ratio), for horizons H = 1,5,10,∞ years. In the
remainder of this Section, we comment on these statistics, displaying them in graphical form
to make interpretation easier.
6.1 The contribution of unemployment to earnings inequality
We start by studying the impact of unemployment risk on earnings inequality. In Figure 8,
we compare the variance of yP
itH computed in the sample of employees to the corresponding
variance computed in the whole sample of both employed and unemployed workers.
In a cross-section (H = 1) the log wage variance is one third less than the variance of
log earnings. When the horizon increases, the inequality diﬀerential between both samples is
reduced but never completely disappears (about 15% for lifetime earnings). The memory of the
initial inequality does not vanish as the horizon increases, despite the stationarity assumed for
simulating trajectories, because of time discounting and a ﬁnite retirement age.
The Figure also shows that the ratio of the variance of log PVs of earnings of employees
2260 % is the average replacement ratio in France over the period, see Martin (1996). Note that we neglect
several important features, such as heterogeneity in the replacement ratio, nonstationary UI schemes and speciﬁc
disutility of unemployment.
23In the rest of the paper, present values are always annuitized and we use PV as a shorthand for Annuitized
Present Value. Computing annuities is important in order to compare the present values of earnings sequences
of diﬀerent lengths.
22Whole sample Employees only
Year 1-year 5-year 10-year Lifetime 1-year 5-year 10-year Lifetime
Variance of log
1990 .2449 .2012 .1858 .1753 .1708 .1594 .1539 .1512
1991 .2435 .2036 .1869 .1765 .1728 .1626 .1569 .1544
1992 .2494 .2064 .1902 .1791 .1718 .1622 .1576 .1552
1993 .2621 .2170 .1991 .1864 .1792 .1717 .1670 .1647
1994 .2758 .2259 .2072 .1943 .1830 .1745 .1705 .1694
1995 .2720 .2276 .2085 .1958 .1849 .1778 .1717 .1694
1996 .2729 .2258 .2054 .1913 .1856 .1758 .1703 .1677
1997 .2748 .2249 .2048 .1907 .1858 .1750 .1690 .1661
1998 .2647 .2180 .1995 .1877 .1785 .1702 .1642 .1622
1999 .2659 .2151 .1954 .1830 .1778 .1663 .1600 .1579
2000 .2511 .2060 .1886 .1784 .1778 .1655 .1596 .1575
Gini
1990 .2689 .2490 .2416 .2367 .2409 .2317 .2275 .2255
1991 .2675 .2499 .2421 .2374 .2410 .2332 .2290 .2273
1992 .2686 .2501 .2429 .2380 .2390 .2317 .2285 .2270
1993 .2740 .2558 .2485 .2433 .2419 .2369 .2345 .2333
1994 .2792 .2598 .2526 .2476 .2435 .2387 .2368 .2365
1995 .2774 .2603 .2522 .2470 .2440 .2400 .2365 .2352
1996 .2796 .2599 .2514 .2452 .2453 .2389 .2358 .2341
1997 .2803 .2594 .2506 .2444 .2453 .2388 .2350 .2332
1998 .2755 .2557 .2472 .2421 .2415 .2356 .2317 .2306
1999 .2757 .2538 .2448 .2389 .2410 .2335 .2292 .2274
2000 .2708 .2506 .2425 .2373 .2424 .2339 .2298 .2277
Percentile ratio, P90/P10
1990 3.323 2.954 2.836 2.782 2.826 2.714 2.638 2.633
1991 3.253 2.963 2.857 2.789 2.802 2.714 2.664 2.652
1992 3.459 2.994 2.893 2.843 2.799 2.708 2.684 2.687
1993 3.694 3.104 2.950 2.879 2.831 2.784 2.738 2.728
1994 3.905 3.173 3.012 2.950 2.916 2.797 2.782 2.779
1995 3.820 3.183 3.041 2.966 2.884 2.828 2.784 2.792
1996 3.833 3.203 3.022 2.940 2.834 2.787 2.749 2.770
1997 3.894 3.180 3.019 2.955 2.788 2.804 2.767 2.773
1998 3.845 3.116 2.954 2.902 2.729 2.766 2.722 2.736
1999 3.839 3.084 2.920 2.872 2.729 2.766 2.722 2.736
2000 3.482 3.022 2.880 2.858 2.855 2.745 2.689 2.710
Table 6: Longer-run inequality for various horizons, 1990-2000 (replacement ratio = 60%,
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year
(solid line = 1 year; dashed = 5 years;
dotted = 10 years; dashed-dotted = lifetime)
Figure 8: Variance of log PVs of earnings of employees as a proportion of the variance of log
PVs in the whole sample (replacement ratio = 60% and discount rate = 5%)
to that in the whole sample decreases at the beginning of the period, from .70 in 1990 to .66
in 1994. Thus, earnings inequality increases more than wage inequality following the 1993
recession, mirroring the increase in the unemployment rate. This business cycle eﬀect vanishes
in the long run.
6.2 The structure of longer-run earnings inequality
In this section we decompose the variance of log PVs of earnings (yP
itH) into four components.
The ﬁrst one is the deterministic contribution of diﬀerences in education and experience across
individuals. It is calculated as the between-group variance of yP
itH across education and expe-
rience cells. The second one, called permanent, captures unobserved heterogeneity diﬀerences
(ηi). We compute it as the within-group variance—by education and experience—of yP
itH simu-
lated with transitory shocks set to zero in order to cancel out any other source of persistence but
ηi. The third and fourth components measure the contribution of transitory shocks. Because
transitory shocks are persistent, we decompose their contribution as follows. A ﬁrst transitory
component (simply called transitory) is calculated as the within-group variance—by education,
experience and unobserved heterogeneity—of yP
itH simulated with i.i.d. transitory shocks, i.e.
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(solid line = deterministic component; dashed = permanent;
dotted = transitory; dashed-dotted = persistent)
Figure 9: Decomposition of lifetime earnings inequality (variance of log PVs of lifetime earnings,
with a replacement ratio of 60% and a discount rate of 5%)
Figure 9 shows the results for the year 1990. The deterministic and permanent components
both explain approximately 40% of the total variance of yP
itH, for all H. Transitory shocks
contribute as follows. Initially, in cross-section, the transitory component accounts for 20%
of the variance. When the horizon increases its share decreases rapidly to 8% after ﬁve years
and 5% after 20 years. In contrast, the share of the persistent component rises to 13% after
3 years, and then decreases slightly to 10%. The total contribution of transitory shocks to
lifetime earnings inequality decreases slightly with the horizon, and accounts for 15-20% of the
total variance of the log PVs of lifetime earnings.
6.3 Evolution, 1990-2000
In this section we document the evolution of longer-run inequality over the 1990s. Panel a)
of Figure 10 shows the evolution of the variance of yP
itH in the sample of employees and the
whole sample, separately. Longer-run inequality follows a similar hump-shaped pattern as
cross-sectional wage inequality. However, the amplitude is signiﬁcantly larger. For example,
the variance of log PV of lifetime earnings (H = ∞) in the whole population of both employed
and unemployed workers grows from .175 in 1990 to .196 in 1995—a 12% increase—and then
returns to .178 in 2000. For one-year earnings, the increase between 1990 and 1995 is 11%.
Panel b) of Figure 10 displays the evolution of the variance of yP
itH in proportion to the
25variance of log earnings yP
it1. As more mobility reﬂects that individuals exchange position more
frequently, this ratio is an index of immobility, and its evolution measures the changes in the
equalizing force of mobility over the decade (see Fields, 2005). Two remarks are in order.
First, according to this index, there is much less mobility in the sample of employees than in
the whole sample. Considering employed and unemployed individuals in the initial period, the
ratio of 5-year, 10-year and lifetime inequality to the cross-sectional variance of log-earnings
ranges around 82%, 76% and 72%, respectively. In the sample of employees, the immobility
index is always close to, or higher than, 90%. This diﬀerence between the two samples is due
to unemployment being a transitory state.
Second, and importantly, the equalizing force of mobility remains remarkably constant over
the decade. Indeed, in the whole sample the ratio of lifetime to current earnings inequality varies
between 72.5% (in 1991) and 68.8% (in 1999). This near constancy is all the more noticeable
that all inequality indices follow a marked hump-shaped pattern.24
7 Counterfactual analyses
In this section, we test the sensitivity of the previous results to unemployment risk, we evaluate
the eﬀect of neglecting unobserved heterogeneity on longer-run inequality, and we measure the
consequences of non Gaussianity and nonlinearity of the process of transitory shocks.
7.1 Varying unemployment risk
First, we study the sensitivity to unemployment insurance by varying the replacement ratio of
Unemployment Insurance (UI) beneﬁts between 40% and 80%.25 Given the UI legislation in
France, these percentages can be seen as conservative lower and upper bounds for unemployment
compensation. Figure 11 shows that lowering the replacement ratio from 80% to 40% has very
signiﬁcant eﬀects on longer-run earnings inequality. Inequality rises by about 25% (lifetime)
24The Gini index gives a similar picture, the ratio of the Gini of the PVs of lifetime earnings to the Gini of
one-year earnings remaining constant over the decade, at 88%. In contrast, using the 90/10 percentile ratio yields
a decrease in the ratio, from 86% in 1991 to 76% in 1994, followed by an increase to 82% in 2000 (see Table 6).
This diﬀerence is due to the sensitivity of the 90/10 ratio to the lower tail of the earnings distribution, hence to
the unemployment rate.
25In addition to the replacement ratio, we checked the robustness of the results to variation in the discount
rate (from 1% to 10%). We also experimented with the way older individuals are accounted for in the calculation



















































































1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000
year
(solid line = 1 year; dashed = 5 years; (solid line = 5 years; dashed = 10 years;
dotted = 10 years; dashed-dotted = lifetime) dotted = lifetime)
a) Variance of log PVs b) Immobility index
Figure 10: Longer-run earnings inequality (replacement ratio = 60% and discount rate = 5%)
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1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000
year
(solid line = 1 year; dashed = 5 years; (solid line = 5 years; dashed = 10 years;
dotted = 10 years; dashed-dotted = lifetime) dotted = lifetime)
a) Variance of log PVs b) Immobility index
Figure 11: Counterfactual simulation of longer-run earnings inequality for replacement ratios
of 40% and 80% (whole sample)
or 60% (one year). The depressing eﬀect of the 1993-1995 recession is also more pronounced
when the replacement ratio is lower, as unemployment risk increases in 1993. Finally, the
equalizing force of mobility is stronger, the immobility index decreasing from 75% to 60% when
the replacement ratio decreases from 80% to 40%. This is because employment spells last
on average much longer than unemployment spells, making unemployment shocks to income
intense but transitory.
Second, we study the consequence of suppressing unemployment risk altogether. The re-








































1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000
year
(solid line = 1 year; dashed = 5 years; (solid line = 5 years; dashed = 10 years;
dotted = 10 years; dashed-dotted = lifetime) dotted = lifetime)
a) Variance of log PVs b) Immobility index
Figure 12: Counterfactual simulation of longer-run earnings inequality with no unemployment
risk (whole sample, replacement ratio = 60% and discount rate = 5%)
increases by 11% from 1990 to 1995, a close match to the 12% increase generated by the actual
parameters. So, cancelling unemployment risks has small eﬀects on the evolution of the equal-
izing force of mobility. However, we see that the level of inequality is now noticeably smaller
(e.g. .155 versus .175 in 1990), and that lifetime earnings inequality is more persistent (index
of immobility of about 80% instead of 72%).
7.2 Neglecting unobserved heterogeneity
Most studies of lifetime earnings inequality are based on models of earnings dynamics that
neglect unobserved heterogeneity (Bowlus and Robin, 2004, Flinn, 2002). To measure the
consequences of this omission, we now estimate and simulate a model where the unobserved
heterogeneity term ηi is set to zero. In the model with unobserved heterogeneity, unemployment
is associated to lower values of ηi, and lower ηi to lower wages. So, omitting unobserved
heterogeneity should yield higher UI beneﬁts for unemployed workers.
Figure 13 shows the simulation of longer run inequality. The variance of log earnings in
cross-section is 15% lower than the corresponding ﬁgures plotted in Figure 10, while the variance
of log PVs of lifetime earnings is 30% lower. Moreover, the index of immobility is now lower



















































































1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000
year
(solid line = 1 year; dashed = 5 years; (solid line = 5 years; dashed = 10 years;
dotted = 10 years; dashed-dotted = lifetime) dotted = lifetime)
a) Variance of log PVs b) Immobility index
Figure 13: Counterfactual longer-run earnings inequality according to the model with no un-
observed heterogeneity (replacement ratio = 60% and discount rate = 5%)
the equalizing force of mobility that the model with unobserved heterogeneity predicts.
So, neglecting unobserved heterogeneity in earnings leads to strongly understate both the
level and the persistence of inequality, and fails at capturing the evolution of mobility.
7.3 Gaussian transitory shocks and copula
Most earnings models assume linear dynamics and Gaussian innovations. In our model, the
transitory process (εit) is AR(1) if margins and copula are all Gaussian. We already established
that the distribution of the permanent component ηi was approximately normal, but that
30Log-wages Unemployment
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Table 7: Parameter estimates for subpanel 1990-1992, model with Gaussian margins and
Gaussian copula.
neither the margins of (εit), nor the copula, were Gaussian. We now test the eﬀect on longer-
run inequality of estimating and simulating a fully Gaussian model.26
Table 7 shows the parameter estimates. Comparing with Table 3, we see that the Gaussian
model yields a very diﬀerent decomposition of log wages into deterministic, permanent and
transitory components. Indeed, the variance of the permanent component is σ2
j = .29652 = .088,
compared to .23042 = .053, that is two thirds more. In the Gaussian model, the unobserved
heterogeneity component thus accounts for 50% of the variance of log wages, compared to 30%
in the non Gaussian model. As a consequence, transitory shocks have a smaller variance and
are much less persistent. Moreover, the Gaussian model predicts more state dependence in
employment (2.03 versus 1.74 for the autoregressive coeﬃcient in unemployment), but a lower
dependence to unobserved heterogeneity (compare the seventh row in the two Tables).
Hence, as expected, the choice of the parametric copula used to describe dynamic tail
dependence does have important consequences on the estimation of the factor loadings.
Figure 14 shows the eﬀect on longer-run inequality. On panel a), we see that the Gaussian
AR(1) model predicts about 12% less earnings inequality in cross-section. This is due to the fact
26With Gaussian margins, the parameter of the Gaussian copula is also the autoregressive parameter of the





31that unobserved heterogeneity is less strongly associated with unemployment than in the non
Gaussian model. The diﬀerence in terms of lifetime inequality is smaller, as the Gaussian model
predicts about 7% less lifetime inequality in the whole sample, and 2% more in the sample of
employees. The Gaussian model predicts an immobility index that is about 5 percentage points
higher in the whole sample. For employees, the ratio is close to 90% in both simulations. The
evolutions of inequality and immobility indices are also nearly identical. It is quite remarkable
that two models with so diﬀerent decompositions of the log wage variance yield so similar lifetime
inequality patterns. Hence, on the three-year data we use in this study, large diﬀerences in
the classical distinction between unobserved heterogeneity (permanence) and state dependence
(persistence) translate into rather similar pictures in terms of longer-run inequality.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we study the evolution of cross-sectional and longer-run measures of inequality in
France in the 1990s, a period characterized by signiﬁcant business cycle ﬂuctuations. For this
purpose, we use the French Labor Force Survey. In order to ﬁt this type of data, we construct a
model that combines a ﬂexible speciﬁcation of the marginal earnings distributions (adapted to
the large cross-sectional dimension) with a tight parameterization of the dependence structure
(that the small number of recording periods requires).
The model’s structure is standard, with an individual eﬀect and stationary transitory shocks,
and we allow parameters to change with the date of entry of individuals into the panel. We
simulate individual trajectories beyond the observation period by drawing from the conditional
distribution given observations. The ratio of the inequality of long-run averages of earnings to
the inequality in a cross-section is an aggregate measure of the persistence of inequality. Thus,
our approach adapts an empirical methodology that has been previously developed for long
panels to short panels like labour force survey data.
The representation of log earnings as the convolution of several factors is standard in the
literature. The necessity of allowing for structural change (i.e. time-varying factor loadings)
is now recognized of utter importance. A few recent papers also point at nonlinearities in the



















































































1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000
year
(solid line = 1 year; dashed = 5 years; (solid line = 5 years; dashed = 10 years;
dotted = 10 years; dashed-dotted = lifetime) dotted = lifetime)
a) Variance of log PVs b) Immobility index
Figure 14: Counterfactual longer-run earnings inequality under full Gaussianity (replacement
ratio = 60% and discount rate = 5%)
33enough to authorize a rigorous discussion of identiﬁcation. Our identiﬁcation discussion is
yet mostly at a conjectural stage. Further work is needed to formulate precise identiﬁcation
statements.
We ﬁnd that the distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity component is approximately
Gaussian and the distribution of transitory shocks is leptokurtic. Relative mobility, as measured
by the joint distribution of the ranks of two consecutive transitory shocks (i.e. the copula),
is also non Gaussian, and best approximated by Plackett’s copula. Unemployment risk and
unemployment insurance are found to be an important source of permanent inequality. Despite
signiﬁcant business cycle ﬂuctuations in wage inequality, wage mobility and unemployment risk
in the 1990s, the measure of the persistence of inequality (the immobility index) is remark-
ably stable. Counterfactual analyses also conﬁrm the importance of allowing for unobserved
heterogeneity.
Moreover, the choice of parametric speciﬁcation for the copula has important consequences
on the estimation of the factor loadings. A Gaussian copula attributes to unobserved hetero-
geneity a greater share of the total log wage variance. As, at the same time, the unemployment
process depends less on unobserved heterogeneity, the Gaussian-copula model yields a very
similar picture in terms of longer-run inequality. If our conjecture on identiﬁcation is correct,
the copula is identiﬁed. In the future, it will be interesting to push the analysis further and
estimate a model with a ﬂexible distribution for both the marginal distributions of ﬁxed eﬀects
and transitory shocks, and the copula.
It will be also interesting to test the model on longer panels. The basic structure of the
model could be extended for that purpose. With four or ﬁve observation periods per individual,
it should be possible to identify and estimate a model with second-order Markov transitory
dynamics, or with an additional measurement error. It would also be interesting to allow for an
additional individual factor governing the unemployment process speciﬁcally. The estimation
algorithm performs well and could easily be modiﬁed to incorporate these extensions.
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38APPENDIX
A Copulas: an economic model
The main structure of our model is a single factor model with ﬁrst-order Markov errors. We
model individual transitory dynamics using copulas. In Section 3, we justiﬁed this choice by
the ability of the copula representation to tightly parameterize the dependence structure while
being ﬂexible as far as marginal distributions are concerned. In this section of the Appendix, we
argue that modelling the law of individual earnings processes using copulas also arises naturally
in steady-state equilibrium models.
The prototypical steady-state search model describes an economy where a population of
heterogeneous ﬁrms post diﬀerent wages, and where a population of homogeneous workers
sequentially search for a job both when they are unemployed and when they are employed. The
wage oﬀer distribution is some function F(w) that depends on the distribution of productivity
across diﬀerent occupations and the search friction parameters. One can allow for heterogeneity
in worker ability by assuming that the labour market is segmented (see for example Van den
Berg and Ridder, 1998).
Search frictions are modelled as follows. Time is discrete. At the end of each period,
an employee can be laid-oﬀ with probability δ or may draw an alternative wage oﬀer with
probability λ. This alternative oﬀer is a draw w′ from the equilibrium distribution F. Employees
accept alternative oﬀers w′ strictly greater than the current wage w. In steady state, the









where κ = λ/δ.27
Conditional on being employed at time t and t + 1 (alternative oﬀers thus accrue with
conditional probability λ

































where 1{w′ ≥ w} = 1 if w′ ≥ w and 0 otherwise. Hence
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27See Burdett and Mortensen (1998). δ + λ[1 − F (w)] is the exit rate from the stock of employees
paid less than w, which is proportional to G(w). The inﬂow is itself proportional to F (w).










Hence, the steady-state search-wage-posting model naturally delivers a simple formula for
the copula, which only depends on the friction parameters δ and λ and not on the equilibrium
wage distribution F. We do not use this speciﬁcation because it would not ﬁt earnings mobility
data well (as wage cuts are impossible). Yet, we want to put forward the interpretation that a
steady-state labour market can be characterized, ﬁrst, by the equilibrium wage distribution G
(i.e. the marginal distribution of employees’ wages), and, second, by a description of the way
workers exchange positions (via mobility rate parameters embodied in the copula C).
Now, the economy is clearly not in steady state. Structural parameters like G, δ and λ
do ﬂuctuate over time. However, there is some evidence that steady-state ﬂow conditions like
(1) or the classical equality between the unemployment rate and δ/(δ + λ0), where λ0 is the
exit rate from unemployment, are empirically well veriﬁed (see Postel-Vinay and Robin, 2006,
and Jolivet et al., 2006). This happens because net annual ﬂows are small in relation to gross
ﬂows. Over a limited period of time, macro trends can thus be neglected and it seems that
workers only exchange positions. This is how we justify our assumption that each subpanel Sj
approximately reﬂects a steady-state economy with a speciﬁc set of parameters.
B The Plackett Copula
Plackett (1965) generalizes the independence condition for contingency tables. He shows that,
if U and V are uniform random variables on [0,1], then the following equation:
P(U ≤ u,V ≤ v)P(U > u,V > v)
P(U ≤ u,V > v)P(U > u,V ≤ v)
= τ + 1 ∀(u,v), (3)






1 + τ(u + v) − [(1 + τ(u + v))2 − 4τ(τ + 1)uv]1/2
o
.
Equation (3) shows that τ is a natural mobility index. More precisely, let us deﬁne the
following ordering -c on copulas, called the concordance ordering (e.g. Joe, 1997):
C1 -c C2 iﬀ C1(u,v) ≤ C2(u,v), ∀(u,v).
-c is the ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance ordering. It measures relative mobility: the ranks
process governed by copula C1 will be said more mobile than the ranks process governed by
C2 if C1 -c C2. Moreover, the concordance ordering possesses a lower and a upper bound
(Fr´ echet, 1935). The lower bound CL satisﬁes: CL(u,v) = max(u+v−1,0). The upper bound
CU satisﬁes: CU(u,v) = min(u,v).
The Plackett copula satisﬁes the following properties (Joe, 1997):
401. C(.,.;τ1) -c C(.,.;τ2) for all τ2 > τ1.
2. C(.,.;τ) → CL when τ → −1.
3. C(.,.;τ) → CU when τ → ∞.
4. C(.,.;τ) → C⊥ when τ → 0, where C⊥(u,v) = uv is the independent copula.
Therefore, the Plackett copula is mobility decreasing with respect to its parameter, and
the Plackett family covers the whole range of bivariate dependence, from immobility (CU) to
independence (C⊥) and perfect mobility (CL).
Simulation. Let u be earnings ranks at time t. For given u, we here show how to simulate
earnings ranks at t + 1 (v) from the Plackett copula. Note that for u ∈ [0,1] given, ∂C
∂u(u,v)
is uniform(0,1). So in order to simulate a v draw a uniform(0,1) variable w and solve for
v in ∂C
∂u(u,v) = w. In the case of the Plackett copula, this implicit equation writes as a
quadratic polynomial equation with two roots in [0,1]. Choose the highest or the lowest root
with probability 1
2.
C Remarks on identiﬁcation
Let us consider the model
yit = ηi + εit, t = 1,2,3.
We assume that individual trajectories are i.i.d. and that ηi is independent of (εit). Let FX
denote the c.d.f. of each variable Xi from an i.i.d. sample {X1,...,XN}, with f = F′ for the
density. Assume that (εit) is ﬁrst-order Markov with Ct (·,·) being the copula of (εit,εit+1), for
t = 1,2. We now provide an algorithm to reconstruct Fη, Fεt, and Ct from the distribution of
(yi1,yi2,yi3).
Start by assuming that the distribution of the individual-speciﬁc eﬀect ηi is known. One
can solve each convolution equation yit = ηi + εit for the distribution of εit. So, Fεt is known
given Fη and Fyt.
Then, consider the joint distribution of (yi1,yi2):
Fy1,y2(x1,x2) =
Z
fη(u)C1 [Fε1(x1 − u),Fε2(x2 − u)]du.
This equation is a functional equation that relates the bivariate functions Fy1,y2 and C1. As-
suming that this functional equation has a unique solution in C1, then C1 is known given Fη.
The same argument identiﬁes C2 from the distribution of (yi2,yi3).






∂2C1 (Fε1 (x1 − u),v)∂1C2 (v,Fε3 (x3 − u))dv,






∂2C1 (Fε1 (x1 − u),v)∂1C2 (v,Fε3 (x3 − u))dv,
where ∂1C1 and ∂2C1 denote the partial derivatives of C1 with respect to ﬁrst and second
arguments. These equations potentially (over)identify the distribution of ηi.
We terminate this section by considering, as an example, the case of a Gaussian copula with









tνit, t = 2,3,





and νit ∼ N (0,1).28 Then,
Var(yit) = Var(ηi) + Var(εit) = Var(ηi) + σ2
t,
Cov(yi1,yi2) = Var(ηi) + Cov(εi1,εi2) = Var(ηi) + τ2σ1σ2,
Cov(yi2,yi3) = Var(ηi) + Cov(εi2,εi3) = Var(ηi) + τ3σ2σ3,
Cov(yi1,yi3) = Var(ηi) + Cov(εi1,εi3) = Var(ηi) + τ2τ3σ1σ3.
The ﬁrst equation identiﬁes σ2
t given Var(ηi). The second and third equations identify τ2 and
τ3 given Var(ηi). Finally, the last equation identiﬁes Var(ηi) as, for example:
Var(ηi) =
Cov(yi1,yi2)Cov(yi2,yi3) − Var(yi2)Cov(yi1,yi3)
Cov(yi1,yi2) + Cov(yi2,yi3) − Var(yi2) − Cov(yi1,yi3)
.
D Estimation algorithm
Fix K, and a grid η
1,...,η
K for the distribution of the permanent component ηi, and ﬁx M the
number of Gaussian components for the marginal distribution of transitory shocks εit.
Let xi = (xi1,...,xiT), yi = (yi1,...,yiT) and ei = (ei1,...,eiT) be the observations for
individual i. Let j (i) ∈ {1,...,J} be the index of the panel sample these observations belongs
to (i.e. j (i) = j such that i ∈ Sj).




pkℓj(yi,ei|xi,k), i ∈ Sj,
28With non Gaussian margins, the Gaussian copula corresponds to the model:

































− 1, and where
ǫ(yit|xit,k) =










































Note that we allow for a speciﬁc marginal distribution of transitory shocks εit to each subpanel
j.
















, and γj, for each individual in the samples Sj, j = 1,...,J, compute the posterior








, m = 1,...,M.
M-step. With pj(k|yi,ei,xi) and πj(m|εit,xit,k) set to these values,



























































































with respect to αj.




















with respect to  mj and ωmj. The solution can be written as weighted means and variances
of the standardized residuals.
• Compute ranks:




















with respect to γj.
44• Lastly, pooling all subpanels together regress the estimates of j-speciﬁc parameters on
a constant, j, j2 and j3. Compute the restricted parameter estimates, and start a new
E-step. Iterate until convergence.
A STATA programme is available from the authors.
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